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THE OFFICE OF PROSECUTOR IN CONNECTICUT
WALTER M. PICKETT*

"The primary duty of a lawyer exercising the office of public
prosecutor is not to convict but to see that justice is done."
Thus it is written in the Connecticut Code of Ethics (Code of
Ethics, 82 Conn., 705 par. 6) and upon this principle is the system
of law enforcement there founded..
At the outset of this sketch of the mode of prosecution in Connecticut, it is desired to emphasize the canon cited not alone because
the "mode" in Connecticut is apparently unique among the states but
as well to challenge that concept of the "public prosecutor" the nation
over, so assiduously advanced by the fiction writer, playwright and
scenarist.
In fiction, upon the stage and in the "movie" it is seldom that
the public prosecutor is portrayed in any-light other than that of a
blood-thirsty, brutal, and more or less unscrupulous monster, chiefly
eager to gain conviction at any hazard, glorying in the scalps at his belt
and evermore seeking to pander to powerful interests that his own
ambitions may be served.
Occasionally to serve the exigencies of poetic license he appears
as a knight in shining armor, a crusader against the monstrous iniquities
of the capitalistic octopus.
These portrayals would be amusingly harmless were it not for that
imponderable credulity which often defrauds intelligence and betrays
honorable people into intellectual slander.
Neither picture is characteristically accurate and sad indeed would
be the social lot if either were true.
Our social order is in the nature of a compact, an agreement to
abide by certain rules deemed for the best advantage of all.
These rules originate in the "decalogue", have been expanded by
accepted experience and find expression in either the "common" ot
"customary law" or legislative enactment.
A proportion of these rules are penal; they have their penal
sanctions. For the enforcement of these rules and the exaction of their
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sanctions, society has appointed its agents; among them the public
prosecutor.
Often it seems that society having endorsed the rules and provided the agency of enforcement turns away to self-serving and washes
hands of further responsibility.
Habitually we expect to go our way unmolested. We take for
granted that our homes are secure from intrusion, our womankind
from outrage, the fruits of our labors from rapine and our lives from
wanton destruction.
A predominant percentage of our fellow men abide by the social
order and justify such expectation; a lesser, but dangerous percentage
are prepared to defy the rule and rob, rape or murder.
To the prosecutor we of necessity trust for protection against
that antisocial element who either cannot or will not adjust themselves
to the social order.
The prosecutor then, is the social agent, charged with the difficult,
often somber, duty of assuring social security on the one hand and
justice upon the other.
Without that great system called the "police power" of which the
prosecutor is an essential factor, every man would perforce be the
guardian of his own.
It needs little imagination to picture the social atavism involved
in such a situation. Freed by the social compact and secured by the
police power man may with reasonable assurance turn his thoughts to
the tasks of civilization and the conquest of his soul. Bound by the
need to secure his own skin he can achieve no more than he can
physically defend and he abides no more than a body to be warmed
and a belly to be fed.
Intelligence, education and religion point the wisdom of obedience
to a social compact; but when intelligence, education and religion fail
to persuade the individual to that obedience, coercion, the sanctions of
the law must intervene to compel where perception and persuasion
fail.
So it is that the prosecutor takes up the task where the educator
and the theologian have exhausted their resources.
His problem is difficult and twofold.
First, he must determine whether or not the law has been violated.
This involves two elements. Is the accused in fact guilty? Is there
evidence at hand that justly establishes his guilt?
If convinced of the foregoing, duty demands that he use every
honorable and fair means to establish the fact of guilt.
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"His conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human
life and liberty are at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he
represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no
conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice, or resentment. If
the accused be guilty, he should none the less be convicted only after
a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established
rules which the laws prescribe." State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn., 160, 168.
Guilt being established, a different problem arises-what to do
with the offender?
Here we have a guilty man, who, despite the systems of education
and religion, has incurred the sanctions of law.
Some of the methods provided by society must now be invoked
to coerce obedience where persuasion has failed. Probation, jail, reformatory, prison-these are the instrumentalities ordinarily available.
Which of these will best serve the purpose of the given case, at once
protecting society and checking the criminal inclination of the subject?
Frequently, if not generally, the prosecutor finds his most oppressing responsibility in the investigation of this phase of his cases,
for of necessity the court must and does rely largely on the recommendations of the prosecutor as to appropriate penalty, or, at any rate,
upon the information which the prosecutor supplies as to the character,
antecedents, environment, history and probable responsiveness of the
subject.
With these observations in mind, let us turn to a consideration of
the mode of prosecution in Connecticut.
Differences sometimes amount to distinctions, sometimes only to
similarities in disguise.
The mode of prosecution in Connecticut is characterized by such
a paradox.
As the slap-stick comedian will everlastingly have it, "she's just
like all the others-she's so different."
Connecticut is not a "code" state. Neither is she a "common law"
state in the strict sense of "English Common law."
"The foundation of our common law in respect to crimes was
laid at the establishment of our commonwealth in 1639. The English
common law as then existing was not adopted here."
Brown's Appeal, 72 Conn., 148, 151.
Rookey v. State, 70 Conn., 104, 109, 38 Atl. 911.
Reference to colonial records and other original sources, will disclose that the Connecticut founders considered that the English corn-
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mon law was not suited in many instances to the conditions and situation
of the new land.
"When the 'Jurisdiction of Connecticut' was organized in 1639,
the law of the land, as recognized by the settlers, consisted in the
orders of the General Court, and, in case of defect of a law, in the
word of God."
Brown's Appeal, 72 Conn., 148, 151, 44 Atl. 22.
Having made a fresh start on the basis indicated, our Connecticut
ancestors developed a criminal jurisprudence of their own, adapting
and adopting so much of the English common law as suited their ideas
and conditions and disregarding what they deemed undesirable. The
influence of English common law is, however, plainly manifest.
Without elaborating this interesting subject further, it will suffice
that as the Connecticut Criminal Procedure differs from that of other
states it is a characteristic difference, deliberately evolved and consistently followed.
(See State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn., 432, 445, where the Supreme
Court asserts (1923)
.
.
.
it has the right to ascertain and declare
the common law, no less the criminal than the civil law.")
Prosecutions in Connecticut can be commenced in four ways and
by four classes of officers.
The "four laws" are complaint," "information," "indictment" and
"presentment."
The classes of officers are "grand jurors," prosecuting attorneys
of city, town, borough or police courts, the state's attorneys and the
grand jury.
A brief description of the several classes of 6fficers may be helpful.
A distinction should be noted between "grand jurors" and the
grand jury.
The "grand jurors" are sworn officers elected annually in the towns
and charged generally with the duty to enquire after and make due
presentment of all crimes and misdemeanors that come to their knowledge. Their presentments are commonly made to a justice of the
peace in the town where offense was committed, may be made by a
single grand juror and are called "complaints." Upon such a "complaint" being exhibited before him, the Justice of the Peace issues the
warrant of arrest, upon which the alleged offender is taken and brought
up for trial. At such trial the "grand juror" commonlyacts as prosecutor, although as grand jurors are frequently laymen, they often
employ an attorney to represent the state, especially if the accused has
employed counsel.
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In cities, towns and boroughs having regularly established local
courts, prosecuting attorneys appointed by the judges of the court, exercise the same authority and prerogatives as "grand jurors," as wel
as some more extended powers. These powers are derived from the
special laws creating the respective courts.
There is a "State's Attorney" in each county, in the larger counties two. These officers are appointed by the judges of the Superior
Court. Their term of office is two years, but by custom they are reappointed so that continuous service of from ten to twenty years has
been the rule.
The powers and functions of the State's Attorneys are historic
and important. Virtually they derive their powers from the common
law of Connecticut, although of course, statutes have been passed from
time to time effecting them.
Historically, the office of State's Attorney traces back to the
King's or Queen's attorney of colonial days. The late Justice Hammersley in the case of State v. Kenna, 64 Conn., 212, gives an interesting chronology in which he writes: "The powers and duties of a
State's Attorney have never been defined by statute law; they are (except in certain particulars specifically enumerated in the statutes) the
necessary incidents of the office, by force of the common law of this
state. The language used in relation to the office has not materially
changed since it was first formally established. In 1704 the "attorney"
for the Queen is required to "prosecute and implead in the law all
criminal offenders, and do all things necessary or convenient as an
attorney to suppress vice and immorallities." 4 Cononial Records, 468.
In 1730 this act was passed; "In each county there shall be one
King's attorney, who shall plead and manage, in the county where such
attorney is appointed, in all matters proper, in behalf of our sovereign
lord, the King." 7 Colonial Records, 280.
"In 1764 apparently to remove any doubt that the representative
of the crown also represented the sovereignty of the colony, the King's
attorneys in the several counties were empowered" to appear in behalf
of the governor and company of the colony in all cases concerning
them or brought for or against them in any of the said counties." 12
Colonial Records, 258. In 1784 it was enacted that-"In each county
in this state, there shall be one state attorney, who shall prosecute,
manage and plead in the county where such attorney is appointed, in
all matters proper for and in behalf of the state. Statutes 1786, p.
11"--and thus to the present day the office has been continued and
maintained under the broad and general duty so described.
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Justice Hammersley in the same opinion continues:
"It has been uniformly held since 1730 that the office then established,
carried with it the duty to conduct all criminal prosecutions in the Superior
Courts, and the power to institute and carry on in every court having
criminal jurisdiction (unless restrained by some statute) any criminal prosecution within the jurisdiction of the court, and also the power and duty
to exercise the common law powers appertaining to the office of Attorney
General, so far as applicable to our system of jurisprudence."
"The power of the State's Attorney to file in the Superior Courts
an original information exists by reason of his being invested with the
common law power of Attorney General, which in this state is greatly
enlarged, because we early adopted the policy of filing an information
in, cases of felonies as well as misdemeanors; and since the adoption
of our constitution, an information may be filed for every crime not
punishable by death or imprisonment for life. It is then the common
law of this state that authorizes the State's Attorney to file information
in the Superior Court.....
It appears from the foregoing that the State's Attorney is the
chief prosecuting officer in Connecticut and that each in his own
county is charged generally with the enforcement of law within his
county and the management and prosecution of all criminal cases
coming before the Superior Court therein.
Reference is made in this opinion to the power of the State's
Attorney to file "information." The "information" is a formal allegation or pleading supported by the oath of office of the State's Attorney,
charging an offender with crime, to which he is required to plead and
upon which he is tried.
The State's Attorney may exhibit his "information" before any
court or justice of the Peace within his county, having cognizance of
the offense charged therein, but he customarily limits his activity to
the Superior Court.
The "information" of the State's Attorney can in Connecticut and
customarily does take the place of grand jury indictment, for all offenses except those involving punishment by death or life imprisonment.
The Connecticut constitution, adopted September 15, 1818, provides in Article 1, Section 9,
and no person shall beholden to
answer for any crime, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a
grand jury.....
The same section 9 guarantees the accused "in all prosecutions by
indictent or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."
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Thus the constitution impliedly sanctions prosecution by information as well as indictment, and as "indictment" is only made a prerequisite in cases involving punishment by either death or life imprisonment we find that in Connecticut all crimes save only murder
and treason can now be prosecuted without the intervention of a grand
jury.
State v. Danforth, 3 Conn., 112.
State v. Kenna, 64 Conn., 212 et seq.
The universal and accepted practice in Connecticut has been for
more than a century to proceed by "information" in all cases where
indictment is not required, the oath of an attorney for the state taking
the place of the'oath of the grand jury, his "information" taking the
place of their "indictment."
It is interesting to note, however, that in Swift's Digest, Vol. II,
Pg. 370, Judge Swift then writing not later than 1823, after defining
"indictment" says, "This is the usual mode of prosecution in England,
and in most of the states in the union, and it might be practiced for
every species of crimes in this state, if the courts thought proper.
As this statute requires an indictment by a grand jury only in
cases where the crime is punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
the practice has been to summon a grand jury in such cases only; and
in all other cases to proceed to trial on the complaint of a single grand
juror, or the information of an attorney for the state."
The practice in vogue in 1823 is the practice of today. That
it has proven a satisfactory practice is perhaps sufficiently demonstrated
by the fact that it has endured.
Earlier in this discussion the statement appears that the State's
Attorney customarily limits his activity to the Superior Court. The
Superior Court is the highest trial court in the state, and now has
jurisdiction over virtually all crimes.
The Superio- Court acquires jurisdiction of an offender either by
power of its own warrant issued upon application of the State's Attorney
or by binding-over process from the justices of the peace or city, town,
borough or police courts.
However the case reaches the Superior Court, the State's Attorney
prosecutes it. Whatever may have been the charge in the lower court,
the State's Attorney may change it to some other, better fitting the
facts.
If he finds that one individual has committed several crimes in
various towns in the county, he may within certain limitations join
these in one information.
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In short, by the system of informations the State's Attorney may
make his pleadings fit the facts, amending if necessary at almost any
stage of trial, provided no substantial unfair prejudice results to the
accused thereby.
It will be observed that the method of prosecution on information
is elastic, inexpensive, convenient and far less cumbersome and slow
than the grand jury system.
Probably in states where the grand jury system obtains, the power
vested in an individual to inform against a man and set him to trial
will be thought dangerous.
More than one hundred years of experience in Connecticut has not
found it so.
The safeguards seem to be, first, the high ideal of service, and the
high type of man customarily found in the State's Attorney's office,
and, second, thd substantial freedom from political influences which the
method of appointment assures.
By way of practical safeguard is a statutory provision empowering
the court as follows:
"The Superior Court having jurisdiction of criminal cases shall at all
times have jurisdiction and control over informations and criminal cases
pending therein and may, at any time upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such defendant discharged, if in the
opinion of the court there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the
bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person
accused therein on trial."
Acts 1921, Chpt. 267, S. 3.
The existence of this power enables the trial judge to stop unwarrantable proceedings and the power of removal or refusal to reappoint vested in the judges would be an obvious restraint upon abuse of
office.
It has been noted that the indictments may be had for "all species
of crimes," as Judge Swift states it.
A curious feature of the grand jury procedure in Connecticut is
that the State's Attorney is not allowed to attend in the grand jury
room even for the purpose of examining witnesses or in any way assisting the grand jury. He may submit to the grand jury a list of witnesses with an annexed summary of what these witnesses may be
expected to testify, and may also lay before the grand jury such proposed indictments as he deems proper, but having done these things
he is debarred from further intervention. With this notable exception,
the grand jury procedure in Connecticut is substantially similar to that
of other states.
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"Presentment" is mentioned in the constitution and also in the
forepart of this discussion as one of the methods of commencing criminal action.
Judge Swift writes of "a presentment by a grand jury which
differs from an indictment only in being made by the grand jury of
some offense within their, own knowledge, and into which they are
bound to inquire," and says, "after such presentment is delivered to
the court, an indictment is framed upon it by the proper officers of
the court; for it is regarded merely as instructions to an indictment to
which the party must answer." Swift's Digest, Vol II, 372.
In practice "presentments" seem to have been unknown in Connecticut, though the power to make them exists.
An interesting example of the modern use of an ancient power
is presented by the empanelling in Hartford County about a year ago
of a so-called "extra-ordinary grand jury" which was summoned to
and did investigate the "Medical Diploma Mill Scandal" as it was
described in the press.
So far as the writer can learn, no grand jury had ever before
been empanelled and "turned loose" as it were, on a general investigation of that character in this state, although such practice seems
fairly common elsewhere. The findings of fact by that grand jury
were in the nature of "presentments."
The charge delivered by Judge William M. Maltbie, then of the
Superior Court, to that grand jury is a most interesting document and
is probaly unique in Connecticut jurisprudence.
A somewhat recent innovation in Connecticut criminal practice
is a statute permitting an accused person to waive jury trial and elect
instead to be tried before the court without a jury.
Acts 1921, Chapter 267, Sect. 2.
It was originally supposed that this act would be rarely evoked
and then only in' cases where the circumstances might be supposed to
arouse resentment in the minds of jurors.
In practice, the system has proven astonishingly and increasingly
popular, if the number electing court trials can be taken as criterion.
Certainly much time is saved by the court trial, and it would seem
that valid defences receive more intelligent consideration from trained
judges than from untrained jurors.
As an amusing sidelight, lawyers with dubious defences still claim
jury trials.
In all criminal cases in Connecticut "the state" is the prosecutor.
The offenses are aginst "the state." The victim of the offense is not
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a "party" to the prosecution nor does he occupy any relation to it other

than that of a "witness," an interested witness mayhap but none the
less only a witness.
It is not necessary that the injured party make complaint, nor is
he required to give bond to prosecute; he is in no sense a "relator."
He cannot in any way control-the prosecution and whether reluctant or
no,. he can be compelled like any other witness to appear and testify.
As expressed in the case of Malley v. Lane, 97 Conn., 132, 138;
"The peace is that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the
comfort and happiness of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure"--thus crime in Connecticut is considered an offense
against society in the aggregate-the state-and is punished by the
social agency-the government-in the discharge of a duty.
That this theory is not followed in all our states at least as to
some grades of offense is, of course, well known.
This brief sketch of "The Mode of Prosecution in Connecticut"
may perhaps serve not alone to indicate the unique features of that
system, which after a century or more of usage have been found
excellent, but will, it is hoped, emphasize the high quality of public
service which the "Prosecutor" is called upon to render.
Possessed as he is of vast powers, they carry a commensurate
responsibility.
Clothed with a wide descretion, he must be deeply sensible of the
gravity of his decisions.
Ever must he be mindful of that mandate of the code of ethics
"to see that justice is done."
To his office come the powerful and the weak, the wealthy and the
impoverished.
Of the evil nature of mankind he sees much, but in the worst he
discovers some "toad's jewel," whether of loyalty,, love, generosity or
courage.
Ever and ever must he find his heart torn by that ever present fact
that punishment of the guilty descends with graver force and hardship
upon the innocent dependents of the culprit. The sinner may go to
prison but the heart-sick wife is driven to the sweat shop, and the
innocent babe to the foundling asylum, or the gray-haired mother in
sorrow to her grave.
Constantly he is reminded that human nature, in whatever habiliments and panoply concealed is the same today as last week and in the
banker as in the beggar.
Not fiction nor romance contains a half the strange reactions that
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life itself reveals, nor is human motive ever to be discovered by rule
and rote.
To approach human frailty with intelligent sympathy and understanding; to adjust the needs of society for, protection, to the vagaries
of human waywardness; to accomplish the purpose of a great social
experiment with the often crude agencies that society supplies; to be
justly stern, but ever just; to yield to no hysteria, whether of heartless
clamor or flacid sntimentality; to know no favorites and fear no reprisals; to forge steadily on with such courage, sincerity and fidelity as
God gives him and the wisdom of experience supplies; these needs
must the prosecutor attempt with the knowledge that at the end his
fidelities will be often deemed brutalities, his sincerity given sinister interpretation and his courage seldom credited.

